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BORIS KOLLÁR AND OĽaNO PARTY COMMUNICATION ON 
FACEBOOK1 
 




The study analyses communication of populist rhetoric by Slovak populist politicians and 
populist political parties before the 2019 elections to the European Parliament and then, for 
comparison, in selected days during non-electoral period in July 2019. The analysis was 
based on a populism index that measures the complexity or depth of the populist discourse: 
people-centredness, anti-elitism and exclusion of out-groups. It was found that the main 
difference between the two political actors was in how they related to out-groups. Comparing 
two selected periods, it was found that – surprisingly- the intensity of populist rhetoric 
increased for both entities in the latter period. The theoretical contribution of this paper to 
methodology of populism index is that 'thin' or 'thick' dimensions of populism, as such, do not 
reveal subtle, but crucial differences among seemingly identical populist rhetoric.  
 
Key words: Sme rodina, OĽANO, Populism, Slovakia, Kollár, Matovič, Facebook, 
Elections, European Parliament 
 
Introduction 
This study analyses Facebook communication of a populist political leader, 
Boris Kollár, chairperson of political party Sme rodina - Boris Kollár (We are a 
Family – Boris Kollár, or WAF-BK)2 and the official Facebook website of similar 
                                                          
 Dr. Adina Marincea is a Senior Researcher at School of Communication and Media, 
Handlovská 45, 851 01 Bratislava, Slovak Republic, e-mail: adina.marincea@gmail.com. 
Dr. Andrej Školkay is a Director of School of Communication and Media, Handlovská 45, 
851 01 Bratislava, Slovak Repubic, e-mail: askolkay@gmail.com.  
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24040/politickevedy.2020.23.4.109-136 
1 The text was internally reviewed by Dr. Viera Žúborová and Igor Daniš. This project has received 
funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant 
agreement No 822590 (DEMOS Project) Any dissemination of results here presented reflects only the 
consortium's (or, if applicable, author's) view. The Agency is not responsible for any use that may be 
made of the information it contains. 
 
2 The Parliament has passed a law that forbids parties to use the names of party leaders in the party 
name. Thus, WAF-BK has changed its name from November 1, 2019 to We are a family. 
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partially populist movement Obyčajní ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti (OĽaNO) – 
Ordinary People and Independent Personalities. 
First, we used selection criteria based on selected political science indicators. 
In other words, we selected political parties/movements or their leaders based on 
their closeness to populist rhetoric according to prevailing academic and non-
academic consensus and a lack of standard ideological orientation (discussed 
below). Moreover, both parties are present in the national parliament and both 
parties ran for the European Parliament in 2019 elections (but only OĽaNO is 
present in the European Parliament – EP for 2019-2024 term). 
Second, selection criteria were based on social media usage. In other words, 
we selected particular Facebook pages based on public availability of their 
profiles. While Kollár´s Facebook website was much more popular (126,000) 
than that of his party (83,000), in case of OĽaNO there was an opposite situation: 
Matovič´s Facebook was much less popular (42,000) than that of his movement 
(117,000) in 2019. Therefore, we analysed posts from Kollár’s Facebook page 
and posts from OĽaNO Facebook webpage. 
The selection of these two political entities shows that both are “non-
standard” political parties/movements. WAF-BK actually self-defines as a "non-
standard" party, while OĽaNO is less openly, but still, internally and externally, 
seen as a non-standard party (for example, there were only four party members3). 
Both OľaNO and WAF-BK are openly eclectic in their ideological agendas and 
priorities, occasionally having mutually contradictory positions at some issues 
(especially OľaNO), or at least not clear ideological profiling.4 
There are other parties/movements in Slovakia that also show some populist 
features, but these have transparent ideological orientation. Nonetheless, there 
is no consensus how to describe analytically either of these two selected 
parties/movements or their leaders. 
Although there is no consensus how to define WAF-BK according to 
traditional approaches within the political science, most analysts agree that it is 
something “non-standard”, and some are inclined to call it a populist subject (with 
some additional features). In particular, Gyárfášová, Bahna and Slosiarik (2017) 
define WAF-BK primarily as the new anti-system party. In contrast, Goliaš, Hajko 
                                                          
3 Again, as a result of legislation, from November 2019, there must be changes in party internal 
organisation, including widening membership – there are options how parties can do that. 
4 Since both entities formed government in 2020, there appears to be emerging some ideological or at 
least value-based profiling. 
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and Piško (2017, p.15) call WAF-BK a populist political body. Conservative 
journalist Martin Hanus suggests that WAF-BK is a social-nationalist (popular) 
movement (Mrvová, 2018). Garaj (2018, pp.150-151) puts WAF-BK among 
“centre-right subjects with conservative attitudes”, although he mentions that the 
party does not have clear ideological profile but “rather reflects current issues 
according to their attractiveness”. The BTI report (2018) defines WAF-BK as a 
populist xenophobic political party. 
Interestingly, in the case of OĽaNO, analysts are even more hesitant to label 
it primarily as a populist party, although perhaps all agree that it is a non-standard 
political subject, too. Gyárfášová (2018, 112) argues that OĽaNO represents a 
unique anti-establishment and anti-elite “grouping”.  In her analysis, OĽaNO lacks 
not only the organizational structure typical for standard political parties but also 
a clear ideological profile. Marušiak (2017) believes that the central position of 
the leader controlling the party financing, allows to define OĽaNO as an example 
of ‘owner party’. Dolný and Malová (2017) inform that OĽaNO MPs were only 
loosely issue-specific coordinated. Garaj (2018, p.150) highlights OĽaNO´s rather 
ad hoc reactions to current issues. Its focus to issues relevant to small and 
medium enterprises may indicate centre-right ideological location, while focus on 
Roma minority and social issues in general may suggest opposite (more liberal), 
ideological orientation, concludes Garaj. Mihálik and Jankoľa (2016, p.10) pointed 
at OĽaNO´s inconsistent positions towards foreigners: on one hand, perceived 
threat from labour migrants has been introduced, on the other hand, there was 
expressed a call for solidarity with migrants, both positions articulated through 
party leadership. 
Gyárfášová (2018, 124) suggested that WAF-BK is possibly an alternative to 
OĽaNO for a new generation. Most recently, Frič and Gyárfášová (2019) label 
both political entities as populist, anti-establishment parties. 
However, there are normative and communicative differences between these 
two parties. Indeed, a majority of selected local experts and civic activists agreed 
that Kollár and WAF-BK should be seen with a critical eye. Selected local experts5 
further believed that among political parties WAF-BK was mainly harmful to 
democracy, while OĽANO was seen as slightly contributing to the prosperity of 
democracy (Goliaš, Hajko and Piško 2017, 10). Neither party was in government, 
                                                          
5 Among 81 participants there were approximately 30% activists from NGOs, 27% from business and 
economic analysts, 21% academicians, 12% journalists and other publicists and 10% civil servants 
and politicians. 
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so this assessment must be based on their rhetoric or, possibly, political agendas 
in general. Nonetheless, it is interesting to find that a party/movement without 
clear or consistent ideology, with some or full aspects of populist rhetoric (as will 
be seen later on) can be seen as contributing to the prosperity of democracy.  
 
1 Social and political context of 2019 EP elections 
The general social and political context of 2019 EP elections was influenced 
by consequences produced by the murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak 
a year earlier. Since then, media reports, probably based on leaks from the police 
investigation, sometimes confirmed by the state authorities (and sometimes not 
dismissed by the state authorities as untrue), presented unofficial evidence of 
partially captured state that operated in Slovakia until the early 2018 at least. 
Moreover, and partially as a result of these revelations, a more radical anti-
establishment political party, Kotleba-ĽSNS, was gaining popular support. As a 
result, pro-European voters seemed to be more motivated to go to vote, further 
encouraged on the one hand by fear caused by Brexit, on the other hand by 
general support for deeper EU integration. This latter aspect was most visible 
among supporters of Progressive Slovakia. However, typically, pro-European 
voters, and ecologically sensitive voters were not present among the youngest 
generation but among the mid-generation. In general, quite many voters did not 
understand MEPs´ role, assuming that they should represent “Slovak interests” 
in the EP (Gyárfášová, in Koreň, 2019). 
The elections to the EP in Slovakia have brought some interesting results. 
Slovaks have chosen mostly pro-European politicians to represent them in the 
EP. Moreover, voters have turned away from governing coalition parties at 
national level (out of three ruling coalition parties, two parties did not get any 
MEPs). Interestingly, EU-critical, populist party WAF-BK, although popular in 
national opinion polls, did not win any EP seat either. One reason for this later 
failure could be that the main candidate was not the chairperson, but rather a 
national MP with little notoriety or charisma. The populist party also fared poorly 
in presidential elections held in March 2019, with another not much popular 
candidate, also an MP, running for President. Since the last party that past 
threshold to the EP was taken by light-populist/anti-corruption, conservative 
movement OĽaNO with 5.25 % and just one MEP (previously 2 MEPs, ECR 
Group), there are other, more general reasons for failure of populist political 
parties in elections to the EP in Slovakia. For example, it could be a close 
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association of WAF-BK with Salvini and Le Pen. 
Although voters´ turnout was still the lowest within EU (22.74 %), it has 
increased compared to the previous elections in 2014 (13.05 %). Perhaps 
paradoxically, more than half of Slovaks believed EU membership to be a good 
thing for Slovakia, while only 8 percent considered it to be a bad thing, according 
to a poll conducted in April 2019 by the Focus polling agency.  
There were 30 political parties/movements running in this election, many of 
them rather bizarre. The winner (with 20.11 %) was a coalition of two new 
progressive/civic, anti-corruption and reform oriented pro-EU parties, not yet 
present in national parliament: Progressive Slovakia (PS, with two MEPs who 
later joined Renew Europe Group in EP) and Spolu-občianska demokracia 
(Together – Civic Democracy), with two MEPs who later joined EPP Group in EP. 
Direction-Social Democracy (Smer-SD), winner to the national parliament 
elections in 2016, as well as 2014 elections to the EP, finished this time closely 
at the second place (15.72 %), gaining three MEP seats (previously four MEPs, 
S&D Group). 
 All three parties were pro-EU, especially Progressive Slovakia. In contrast, 
the third place was taken by anti-EU Kotleba-ĽSNS (12.07%). This xenophobic, 
protest and anti-immigrant party was not previously present in the EP. One MEP 
is „non-attached“ (i.e. no political group in EP), the other is also „non-attached“ 
as well as „independent“ (i.e. not member of the party itself). 
Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) at the fourth place was supported by 
9.69 % and thus gained two MEPs (down from three MEPs, EPP Group).  
Liberal, libertarian, partly Eurosceptic, Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) got 9.62 
% and two MEPs (ECR Group).  
Apparently, strongly pro-EU (PS and Together) and strongly anti-EU (Kotleba 
-ĽSNS) parties were the most successful in mobilising their electorates. 
As mentioned, poor results for populist and/or anti-establishment and protest 
parties (WAF-BK, OĽaNO) suggest that strong anti-EU rhetoric was appropriated 
by Kotleba-ĽSNS, thus leaving other protest parties with less obvious targets. 
There were no migrants, no other urgent issues. Indeed, the main slogan of WAF-
BK was appealing to common sense with some emotional background „Less 
Brussels, more Common Sense“, while OĽaNO‘s main slogan was a positive, and 
future-looking message: „Let us Repair, not to Tear Down Our European Home“. 
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The key Message and the key Candidate (with chairperson in background) 
of We are family - Boris Kollár 
Source: webpage of the party 
 
The main billboard and message of OĽaNO (with picture of Igor Matovič) 
Source: Webpage of the movement 
 
OĽaNO was the most active party in the number of posts which focused on 
corruption (political-criminal) “mafia”, opinions on the highly politicised process of 
selecting candidates for judges at the Constitutional Court, the criticism of the 
Minister of Agriculture Gabriela Matečná, and criticism of the Speaker of the 
Parliament Andrej Danko. The party published a number of LiveFB posts 
focusing on the domestic politics and at the same time it organized many events 
across Slovakia. Facebook posts were largely in line with the traditional 
messages of the party - a lot of criticism, statements and enthusiastic support for 
a particular cause (Godársky, Kužel, Mračka, 2019, 77). 
It should be mentioned that WAF-BK also raised positive issues in its 
campaign. For example, it highlighted its own proposal for a 13th pension 
allowance, abolishing option of voting in abstention in the parliament, social policy 
suggestions, especially its original agenda – debts execution amnesty (Godársky, 
Kužel, Mračka, 2019, 85). 
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In general, the monitoring of public Facebook accounts of parties running in 
the European Parliament elections between 1 April and 15 May 2019 further 
revealed that political parties mostly focused on domestic policy issues, in 
addition to those already mentioned, such as price/quality of food, the anniversary 
of the tragic death of M.R. Štefánik (a symbol of Slovak modern history), the 
liberation of Slovakia during WWII, pensions/parents’ allowance, and state 
symbols protection. At the same time, political posts contained a lot of positive 
campaign aimed at promoting ideas of united Europe and benefits of the EU 
membership and integration in general, primarily offered by the (later to be) 
winning coalition. Some opposition parties used FB intensively to campaign for 
their candidates and also attempted to motivate voters to go out to vote. Instead 
of running parties (not only WAF-BK or OĽaNO) attacking each other, there was 
rather a strong informally unified approach to combat extremisms and its political 
representatives, represented mainly by Kotleba-ĽSNS (Godársky,  Kužel, 
Mračka, 2019). 
Sociologist Slosiarik articulates that the first time when social media played 
an important role in election campaigns in Slovakia was during the 2016 
parliamentary elections (Sme, December 31, 2016, p.2). During 2019 campaign 
for the EP elections, the most popular sources of information about candidates 
and parties were actually debates on television, radio and on the Internet, as well 
as special supplements of newspapers (Gyárfášová, in Koreň, 2019). Thus, 
although social media played an important role, it was not an exclusive role.  
It is also assumed that higher voter turnout was due to more diverse 
messages specifically targeting selected audiences (Gyárfášová, in Koreň, 
2019). These included alternative news and current affairs websites. However, 
alternative websites, also present on Facebook, quite popular in Slovakia, paid 
little attention to EP elections in their news and current affairs sections.6 Between 
April 10, 2019 to May 10, 2019 (before the official election campaign in the 
media), only 175 posts published on FB pages of alternative websites were 
related to the campaign before the EP elections. The issues discussed most often 
were nationalism as the only solution, together with immigration as a threat. 
These topics were supplemented with a negative framing of liberalism and 
                                                          
6 The monitored FB pages of these alternative websites were selected based on the following metrics: 
number of fans, number of page storytellers, and the average number of interactions per fan - those 
openly affiliated with a specific political party were omitted, including the Facebook pages of individual 
candidates. 
═════════════ Politické vedy / Studies ══════════════ 
 
116 
references to a so-called 'EU Dictate'. Three political parties were mentioned on 
the monitored Facebook pages of alternative media the most often: the right-wing 
Kotleba-ĽSNS (Kotleba-People´s Party Our Slovakia, the liberal-centrist coalition 
PS-Spolu- Občianska demokracia (Progressive Slovakia /Together – Civic 
Democracy) and the WAF-BK. Both Kotleba-ĽSNS and WAF-BK were the only 
parties that gained significant positive evaluation on monitored alternative 
websites coverage (Sawiris, 2019). 
 
2 Methodology 
The methodology of this study relies on content analysis of the Facebook 
posts published by Boris Kollár – leader of WAF-BK party, and OĽaNO party 
before elections to the EP, compared to a non-elections period: July 2019. The 
samples were formed based on constructed weeks sampling strategy, and the 
number of posts was chosen based on the median number of posts published by 
the countries analysed in the DEMOS project7. This brought an elections sample 
of max. 44 posts published between 10-23 May 2019 (two weeks before the 
election, which was held on 25 May), for each candidate/party, and a post-
elections sample with 38 posts from the month of July. Boris Kollár published 
less than 44 posts during the pre-election interval, which made his sample to be 
smaller: 31 posts. On the other hand, OĽaNO published 72 posts during the two 
weeks in May, a sample which was then reduced to 44 posts. 
In July, OĽaNO published 87 posts and Kollár – 41 posts. For each of them 
we sampled 38 posts based on the constructed weeks strategy, and two different 
local coders were assigned to code the resulting four datasets. At the national 
level, we conducted an inter-reliability test using Krippendorff’s Alpha coefficient. 
For the variables with low reliability scores, a second round of coding by another 
two coders was carried out, and in exceptional cases, where different opinions 
still persisted, a final, expert coder manually reviewed the cases and made a final 
decision. 
For analysis, we calculated a populism index that measures the complexity 
or depth of the populist discourse: whether it includes only one dimension out of 
the traditional three found in the literature (people-centredness, anti-elitism and 
exclusion of out-groups) – a form of thin or empty populism centred around „the 
people“, two dimensions or thick populism (anti-elitist and/or exclusionary) or all 
three of them – complete populism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Aalberg & de 
                                                          
7 „Democratic Efficacy and the Varieties of Populism in Europe“, https://demos-h2020.eu/en. 
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Vreese, 2017). In our empirical approach, we operate with the following 
definitions: „Complete populism includes reference and appeals to the people, as 
well as anti-elitism and exclusion of out-groups. Exclusionary populism includes 
only reference and appeals to the people and exclusion of outgroups, whereas 
anti-elitist populism includes reference and appeals to the people and anti-elitism. 
Finally, empty populism includes only reference and appeals to the people” 
(Aalberg & de Vreese, 2017, p. 6). 
 
3 Populist communication strategies on Facebook  
During the campaign before elections, Boris Kollár and OĽaNO employed 
typical populist communication strategies in a similar manner and with an 
identical frequency, in over half of their posts (61% Kollár and 59% OĽaNO 
respectively). However, they differed slightly in the depth and type of strategies 
preferred, as well as in their messages. Overall, Kollár resorted to populist 
strategies slightly more often than OĽaNO (Fig. 1), and his populism was „thicker“ 
than OĽaNO’s, despite the fact that the latter also had a few posts employing all 
three populist components (complete populism – 2% posts for OĽaNO, none for 
Kollár). Both OĽaNO and Kollár had an equal number of posts that lacked any 
populist dimension (41% posts versus 39% for Kollár), while OĽaNO had slightly 
less bi-dimensional populist rhetoric (21% posts versus 26% for Kollár).  
 
Figure 1 Number of references to populist strategies. % from all posts 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Both shared during the election campaign criticism addressed to elites (27% 
OĽaNO posts and 19% Kollár), which in itself is insufficient to be considered 
populist because it lacks other key dimensions like references to „the people“, 
and attacking opponents is a rather typical political discourse strategy. There was, 
however, a thicker form of anti-elitism, combined with appeals to „the people“ 
(16% OĽaNO’s posts and 6% of Kollár’s).  
The main difference between the two political actors was in how they related 
to out-groups. Kollár’s exclusionary populism combined anti-elitism with 
exclusion of other groups (19% cases), while OĽaNO either resorted to simply 
criticizing other groups, disconnected from people or elites (7% cases), or, less 
often, contrasted the people with the excluded others (5% cases). 
Another difference between the two was in how much they employed empty 
populism - a form of thin populism that is most common is „normal“ political 
discourse (Jager & Walgrave, 2007) and is limited to people-centeredness (16% 
Kollár and 2% OĽaNO). This difference may be explained by the very nature of 
their origin – while WAF-BK can be described as „anti-system“ (but still within 
democratic regime), OĽaNO founding was motivated by fight against corruption. 
 
Figure 2 Dimensions of populist discourse. % of all posts 
Anti-elites = only 1 reference, critical of elites; anti-others = only 1 reference, critical 
of out-groups; people-centred = only 1 reference, „the people“; people+elite=anti-
elitism (2 references); people+others=exclusionary populism (2 references); 
elite+other=critical towards elites and towards outgroups (2 references);complete 
populism=the people+anti-elites+out-groups (3 references); 
  
Source: Own elaboration 
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In our further inquiry, we tested whether the communication strategies of the 
two political actors changed outside election period. During the month of July, we 
analysed a sample of 38 posts for each, based on the constructed weeks 
sampling strategy. What resulted from the analysis is a common strategy that 
both actors seem to have employed: their discourse became more populist, and 
more critical towards elites after the elections (Fig. 3 and 4). Neutral posts 
dropped to more than half, more precisely from 41% to 18% for OĽaNO, and from 
39% to 18% for Kollár.     
 
Figure 3 Types of populism-OľaNO. % of all posts   Figure 4 Types of populism-
Kollár. % of all posts 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
In other words, both OĽaNO and Kollár seem to have toned down their 
populism during the electoral campaign, when messages were more carefully 
crafted and less symbolically charged. However, this moderation seems to be 
dropped after the campaign, when communication becomes more populist. 
Drawing on the operationalizations from the cited literature, we conclude that 
OĽaNO’s use of populist rhetoric increased from 25% to 37%. After elections, 
OĽaNO focused more on anti-elitist populism (combining people-centredness 
and anti-elitism) – from 16% to 24% of all posts, as well as an empty populism 
(only references to „the people“), which increased from 2% to 11%. Complete 
populism, combining all 3 dimensions (people-centredness, anti-elitism and 
exclusion of others), increased symbolically by 1%. The only dimension that 
disappeared completely is exclusionary populism (from 5% to no posts).  
Similarly, Kollár’s discursive populism increased after elections from 42% 
posts to 68%, well over half of all his posts. Empty populism dominated, with an 
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increase from only 16% during elections to 29% afterwards, closely followed by 
anti-elitist populism, in 24% of all posts, compared with a mere 6% during 
elections. Exclusionary populism and complete populism, which were completely 
absent during elections in social media campaign, now added up to 8% of all 
posts. The only dimension that decreased by more than half was the „criticism of 
elites“ combined with „exclusion of others“ but in the absence of explicit 
references to „the people“, a dimension which was entirely missing in OĽaNO’s 
case. In Kollár’s posts, this dimension dropped from 19% to only 8% of all posts.   
In short, OĽaNO’s strategy after elections shifted the focus towards criticism 
of the political elites, mostly their national political opponents, combined with 
slightly more appeals to the people, while dropping attacks on out-groups. By 
contrast, Kollár’s after election strategy relied heavily on calls to the people, while 
criticism of elites remained rather constant and exclusion of out-groups remained 
significant, despite the small decrease.  
 
3.1 The construction of „the people“ 
The way the two constructed “the people” during elections differed. For 
Kollár, collective identity was built largely on common fate (57% cases), which 
was entirely absent in OĽaNO’s discourse. They both employed a victimization 
frame (29% Kollár and 27% OĽaNO), resorting to an identity group that „the 
people“ belong to and highlighting their virtues (18% OĽaNO, 14% Kollár). They 
differed in that Kollár equally drew on people’s achievements, while OĽaNO 
focused on people’s sovereignty (18%) and their similarity (9%) as unifying 
factors, and also visually represented them in 9% of the cases.  
 




Source: Own elaboration 
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Kollár appealed to „the people” in almost a quarter of posts, either through 
empty populist rhetoric, or by employing thicker forms of populism like anti-elitist 
populism. Most often, „the people“ was constructed through victimization and 
appeals to common fate, resorting to history and a sense of belonging to larger 
European movements like the right-wing populist Europe of Nations and Freedom 
(ENF), and a declared alliance with leaders like Matteo Salvini and Marine Le 
Pen: 
No one will silence the voice of the peoples of Europe who want to be free! 
(Identity & Democracy Party, 13 May 2019, shared by Kollár, 14 May 2019). 
Our SME RODINA - Boris Kollár is part of the great Movement for a Europe 
of Nations and Freedom, whose main points are the protection of EU borders, 
national culture and tradition, but above all, helping ordinary people. (Sme rodina, 
23 May 2019, shared by Kollár, 23 May 2019). 
WE ARE FAMILY became part of the Movement for a Europe of Nations and 
Freedom (ENF), whose ambition is to reform a Europe that will protect borders, 
preserve national traditions, but especially help ordinary people. We are part of a 
great movement led by Matteo Salvini and therefore your voice does not fall! 
(Sme rodina, 23 May 2019:7.03PM, shared by Kollár, 23 May 2019). 
Appeals to the people during elections appeared with similar frequency on 
OĽaNO’s page, in a quarter of posts: the people are the key, nation, common 
people, first person plural nouns – us, or simply people. They are defined with 
a focus on their virtues and belonging to an in-group united by national identity: 
Slovaks are a proud nation, good and decent people. This framing gave weight 
to the denouncement that people are victims of the elites, and to the anti-
establishment critique which represents OĽaNO’s main focus: human misfortune, 
human tragedies, many people cannot feed their families, people are being 
ignored, you leave them in poverty (this line of argumentation can be found in 
Kollár’s discourse as well). An additional rhetorical mechanism that OĽaNO used 
as part of the anti-elitist strategy was to remind of the sovereignty of the people: 
people gave you power, this Republic belongs to the people, the people are the 
state, those who voted for you. Most importantly, „the people“ are centrally 
mentioned in the very name of the party („Ordinary People and Independent 
Personalities“). Ironically, as mentioned, the party itself had only very limited 
membership and there was no interest to expand it into a mass party without 
external push. 
We further analysed how the discursive construction of the people changed 
after the elections. When constructing the image of „the people”, OĽaNO 
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continued to prioritize victimization (27% during elections, 21% afterwards), 
focused on defining an identity group (18% during elections, 14% afterwards), 
people’s virtues and achievements (18% during elections, 14% afterwards) or the 
similarities that unite them (9% during elections, 7% afterwards). The change 
included more visual displays of the people (from 9% to 29%), while sovereignty 
framing disappeared completely (from 18% to 0%), replaced by references to a 
common fate (7% post-elections, 0% during elections).  
 
Figure 6 OĽaNO populist dimensions       Figure 7 Kollár populist dimensions....  
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Similarly, victimization of the people remained one of Kollár’s favourite 
discursive strategies (29% during elections, 30% afterwards), but the rest of the 
strategies he employed to construct the people changed. After elections, he 
replaced the prioritization of a common fate that unites people – which was his 
favourite strategy during elections (57% during elections, 13% afterwards), with 
the belonging to an identity group (14% during elections, 65% afterwards). There 
is also somewhat less focus on people’s achievements and virtues (14% during 
elections, 9% afterwards – for each). Instead, just like OĽaNO, Kollár´s 
messages also became more visual in his calls to the people (from 0% to 43%), 
focusing on their similarity (30%), the characteristics that they shared, or even 
their geographical proximity (9%), strategies which were absent during the 
election campaign.  
 
3.2 The construction of the elites 
Most of the anti-establishement criticism brought by OĽaNO was not in the 
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form of anti-elitist populism per se, like Fig. 2 also shows, in the sense that the 
party did not criticize the elite – as a generalized malevolent force opposed to the 
„virtuous people“. Rather, OĽaNO’s posts criticised the government and members 
of the parliament or specific individual representatives or political parties, which 
is a common strategy for national oppositional politics and not necessarily 
populist rhetoric as such. This rhetoric only slides into populism when combined 
with appeals to the people by, for example, victimizing them, or exclusion of 
others, for which the elite is usually to blame: you stole the jobs from them in 
Slovakia, you took their hope for better life in Slovakia, you made an immoral 
step, you steal from your own voters, you leave the people scrape along, you took 
their dignity in Slovakia (of the people). National political elites were almost 
entirely the target of criticism and of „othering“, which also points out that we 
cannot regard it as anti-elitism per se if it is not coupled with people-centredness. 
When criticising their political opponents, OĽaNO resorted to name-calling: 
corrupted, slobs, monsters, mafia that governs. It is important to note that OĽaNO 
and the party leader - Igor Matovič, typically selected specific political and other 
representatives as public targets of anger and criticism during a longer period. 
Thus, a short-term quantitative analysis does not cover the specific long-term 
features of his rhetoric and the extent to which it can be assessed as populist or 
merely criticism of political adversaries.  
 
Figure 8 Anti-elitism during elections. % of all posts criticizing elites 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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On the other hand, Kollár was more diverse in his criticism of elites, who 
remained, most often, the ones at the national political level (71% cases). 
However, his criticism expanded to national business/entrepreneurial elites 
(29%), supranational political entities like the EU (14% posts), media or 
intellectuals (7% each). Kollár’s anti-elitism was harsher than OĽaNO’s, because 
he not only discredited and blamed the elites, but also denied their legitimacy in 
half of the posts (Fig. 11). In addition, his anti-elitism was both more generic than 
OĽaNO’s and more exclusionary: 
Right now (the Parliament had session), and the government coalition 
blocked the draft law and it did not pass. Why? Because they cough on people 
(`they piss on the people`). They only care about business money for their 
sponsors, shareholders and oligarchs. (Kollár, 16 May 2019). 
The standard politics extremely support the richest, multinational 
corporations, financial groups, oligarchs and banks. Standard politicians are 
stealing, deceiving and cheating extremely. Standard politicians must be sent to 
the junkyard of history. (Kollár, 18 May 2019, shared by Ľuboš Hrica, 18 May 
2019). 
 
Figure 9 Type of anti-elitism during elections. % of all posts criticizing elites 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
The changes in rhetoric produced after the elections showed that the anti-
elitism dimension remained a constant. The main target continued to be 
represented by national political elites, more precisely the political opponents 
(changes from 71% to 89% in Kollár’s posts, and from 90% to 85% in OĽaNO’s) 
during the month of July. If, previously, political opponents represented the only 
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target of OĽaNO’s anti-elitism, after the elections the targets diversified, 
complemented by criticism towards economic elites (11%), the media (7%) and 
legal subjects in general (4%). In addition, the tone of the criticism shifted from 
blaming the elites (from 90% to 22%) to discrediting them (from 30% to 52%). But 
despite this diversifying of anti-elitism and apparently less harsh tone, the number 
of posts criticising political elites significantly increased after elections (from 45% 
to 71% of all posts), possibly as a result of the results of the vote.   
Kollár’s preferred targets of criticism remained more or less the same, with 
slight changes of frequency of criticism. While national political actors were 
criticized more often, business actors like companies (especially foreign 
ones/multinationals) were much less likely to be attacked (from 29% during 
elections to 6% afterwards). Supranational political institutions like the EU 
remained among the favourite targets, with only a slight decrease from 14% to 
11%. Criticism targeting the media also somewhat increased (from 7% to 11%), 
and what disappeared entirely was anti-elitism towards intellectuals. While Kollár 
mostly blamed the elites for their actions and decisions (86% during elections, 
89% after), after the elections he seemed to be less inclined to discredit them 
(from 86% to 50%) or to deny their legitimacy (from 50% to 17).  
 
3.3 The construction of „the Others“ 
Figure 10 Construction of out-groups during elections. % of all posts criticizing 
„the Other“ 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Here one could find substantial differences between both entities. While in 
OĽaNO´s rhetoric, „the others“, the out-groups, were almost entirely ideological 
and limited to populists, right-wing extremists and fascists, Kollár‘s exclusionary 
populism had different, even opposite targets (Fig. 12). Most often during election 
campaign, „the others“ were immigrants, liberal and progressive thinkers or 
politicians, the „Brussels technocrats“ or people with different gender identity (like 
Conchita Wurst, who appears in one of his posts). Kollár implicitly or explicitly 
attacks his ideological and political opposition among which - the Progressive 
Slovakia /PS/ and Together /Spolu/ Coalition, as well as liberal experts, calling 
them naive and childish “sunshine” people (slniečkári). He did this by sharing a 
video where a popular hardworking African immigrant praised Italians and far-
right leader Matteo Salvini and criticized allegedly lazy (other) immigrants with 
expensive mobile phones (Mukli SK, 10 September 2018, shared by Kollár, 13 
May 2019). This type of rhetoric employs exclusionary populist strategies to 
attack the progressive or supranational European elites with a pro-immigration 
position, while also defining the excluded group to be that of immigrants and 
refugees. In addition, Kollár often resorted to self-victimization, accusing his 
liberal ideological opponents of being extremist by wanting to censure speech, 
an argument that is frequently employed by populist leaders: 
In recent months, I have come across people who are full of freedom, 
democracy, decency and all these beautiful expressions, which are in places 
hysterical to aggressive and in a very selective way attack a different opinion and 
love to label. We listen to labels like extremism and radicalism. Being an extremist 
because I respect my national traditions, culture, I want to protect my borders - if 
this is extremism, anyone can call me an extremist. (Pčolinský – an MP for 
Kollár´s party 15 May 2019, shared by Kollár, 16 May 2019) 
See how the Progressive Slovakia (PS) and Together (Spolu) Coalition 
present decency and tolerance in practice. SME FAMILY- Boris Kollar welcomed 
representatives of EUROPE OF NATIONS and FREEDOMs, including Marine Le 
Pen, president of the National Assembly There has been talk of protecting EU 
borders, traditional values, but in particular the social dimension, how to help 
ordinary, ordinary people. But apparently the progressives and liberals do not like 
this, who today organized this "decent" demonstration. Vulgarisms, spit, 
aggression and vulgar gestures [...] (Sme rodina, 13 May 2019, shared by Kollár, 
13 May 2019) 
See how PROGRESSIVE SLOVAKIA imagines decency - insults, bad 
language - even spit on us   and they threw food out of their hands. They show a 
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progressive erect median finger (a rather vulgar gesture). We came to them fairly 
and even brought them croissants. Do you think they are capable of dialogue? 
NO! They are aggressive, disinterested people who don't allow another view. I 
really don't want to have anything with these extremists today or in the future, and 
we should do everything we can to prevent such aggressive people from grasping 
power in the state. They were throwing croissants at us today, tomorrow it will be 
cobblestones? (Kollár, 13 May 2019) 
OĽaNO’s discursive strategy in relation to out-groups changed not only its 
focus - much less on exclusionary tactics (from 14% to 3%), but it also changed 
the variety of the targets. There was no more criticism addressed to companies 
or other financially well-off groups. However, the party did attack the people’s 
movement For a Decent Slovakia in one of its posts, where OĽaNO accused the 
initiative’s representatives of lying.  
Kollár’s exclusionary strategy remained, overall, rather steady during and 
after elections. The main targets of exclusion were ideological opponents, namely 
progressives and liberals (83% during elections, 33% afterwards), together with 
migrants and foreigners (inside the country – 33% - during both intervals, outside 
–67% during elections, 17% afterwards). Exclusion based on gender identity of 
sexual orientation was also less of a focus (from 33% to 17%). Interestingly, new 
out-groups became subject of attack after the elections: criminals, more 
specifically – paedophiles (67%), who were connected by Kollár with the 
progressive mindset, a typical right-wing or ultra-conservative stigmatization. This 
issue reflected short-term but intensive debate about paedophilia initiated by a 
local liberal newspaper. Responding to another opposition politician who 
commented negatively on possible post-election cooperation (for the coming 
Parliamentary elections in early 2020), Kollár reminded him that he has been 
defamatory in the past about workers or universal suffrage and allegedly stood 
for issues that he considered morally unacceptable: 
His thoughts [Michal Truban – leader of Progressive Slovakia party], such as 
the unemployed workers are lazy, deceiving, and not all should have the right to 
vote (probably he mean pensioners), welcomes migrants, wants adoption of 
children by homosexuals, wants their partnerships, and most recently he shows 
that paedophilia does not stink ....We will not cooperate with you in any way 








In this paper, we have analysed the Facebook communication of two non-
standard parliamentary Slovak political entities, namely WAF-BK (represented 
primarily, including in this analysis, by Boris Kollár, its chairperson) and OĽaNO 
(party´s official profile) on Facebook during election campaign before elections to the 
European Parliament in May 2019 and then in selected days in July 2019.  Both 
parties/leaders are, to a different degree, seen by local and foreign analysts as populist 
and/or protest parties, political projects focused on anti-corruption – much more so for 
WAF-BK („hard“ populists), and much less so for OĽaNO („light“ populists). Both are 
certainly non-standard political entities. While both parties were present in the national 
parliament, only OĽaNO managed to keep a seat in the EP (but it went down from two 
MEP seats gained in previous elections), while WAF-BK failed in this attempt with zero 
seats in the EP. WAF-BK seems to be significantly associated with its leader, Boris 
Kollár. Indeed, Kollár‘s personal page on Facebook is much more popular than that 
of his party, which consolidates this perception of increased personalisation of populist 
politics, while in OĽaNO´s case there is an opposite situation: Igor Matovič´s 
Facebook (private) profile is much less popular than that of his party or rather, 
movement. Thus Kollár´s rhetoric was analysed here instead of the party itself, and 
the party profile was analysed instead of Matovič´s here.  
WAF-BK‘s failure to gain a MEP seat can then be (to a large part) explained by 
communicating issues that were less attractive to the potential voters of WAF-BK, as 
well as by the fact that Boris Kollár himself did not run for a seat in the EP. In addition, 
more anti-establishment focused voters and more protest-minded voters had a choice 
of even more radical alternative – Kotleba-ĽSNS (that, indeed, gained two MEP seats). 
The latter subject tended to increase its popularity due to continuous revelations of 
partially captured state by legacy media, after the murder of an investigative journalist 
in 2018.  
Another, this time external factor, that left impact on elections debates (as well as 
communication of OĽaNO, at least), was Brexit (referendum of leaving the EU by the 
British voters) and its aftermath. Even the most radical relevant political force, Kotleba-
ĽSNS, did not raise an issue of leaving the EU (although previously Kotleba-ĽSNS 
publicly considered to initiate referendum on that topic). In general, discourse before 
the elections to the EP was, perhaps ironically, very much focused on domestic issues. 
These issues reflected, again, at a very general level, low efficacy of state authorities 
and affiliated selected services.  
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In general, while the role of social media, and especially of Facebook was 
important, it was not crucial. Legacy media still played an important role. Not even 
„alternative“ online news portals proved to be a decisive factor in gaining sufficient 
support among voters for WAF-BK, although they offered a long-term positive 
assessment of WAF-BK (but relatively marginal in numbers of contributions). 
In addition, reports of the legacy media on corruption and captured state, served 
to provide, selectively, and indirectly, support for causes of both entities, as 
communicated by them on Facebook.  
Considering the political and media context described, our empirical analysis 
aimed to uncover the similarities and differences in Facebook communication of these 
„hard“ and „light“ populist subjects. Boris Kollár and OĽaNO employed typical populist 
communication strategies (as defined in populist literature) in a similar manner, but 
with different frequency and specificities. The electoral campaign seemed to have 
functioned as a break on the populist tendencies, either because of the perceived 
distance of European politics, or because of a different kind of scrutiny. This was seen 
in the fact that both political opponents were more moderate in populism during the 
campaign for the EP, increasing their populist rhetoric after the elections. Irrespective 
of the period, Kollár’s discourse was twice as often populist compared to OľaNO. At 
its peak, in July 2019, two thirds of posts from Kollár were populist, while the same 
was true for 4 out of 11 of OĽaNO’s posts.  
The two differed slightly in the depth and type of strategies preferred, but more 
importantly, in their tacit or explicit messages. Overall, Kollár resorted more often to 
populist strategies than OĽaNO.  Both had in common frequent criticism addressed to 
elites. OĽaNO´s criticism of elites was more radical (but at the same time more person- 
and issue-specific), representing a thicker form of anti-elitism, combined with appeals 
to the people.  
Thus, it would be misleading to consider them as identical populist bodies or 
by and large identical populist rhetoric. As it was discussed earlier, local 
observers perceived that there existed  fundamental differences between both 
entities´ contribution to democracy, while both entities were in opposition (and 
before this analysis was done, never in government). 
Our analysis found that the main difference between the two political actors 
was in how they related to out-groups. Kollár’s exclusionary populism combined 
anti-elitism with exclusion of other groups (19% cases), while OĽaNO either 
resorted to simply criticizing other groups, disconnected from people or elites (7% 
cases), or, less often, contrasted the people with the excluded others (5% cases). 
In other words, one political subject was more exclusionary, while the other was 
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more inclusionary or neutral in this normatively important aspect. 
Moreover, OĽaNO usually did not criticize the elite per se – in the sense of a 
generalized malevolent force opposed to the „virtuous people“. Rather, OĽaNO’s 
posts criticised the government and specific members of the parliament or 
specific individual representatives of the state or political parties, which is a 
common strategy for national oppositional politics and not necessarily populist 
rhetoric as such. This rhetoric only slides into populism when combined with 
appeals to the people by, for example, victimizing them, or excluding others, for 
which the elite is usually to blame. This helps to explain why OĽaNO was seen, 
perhaps surprisingly, by a majority of local analysts as a slightly positive political 
force.  
Another difference between the two political entities was in how much they 
employed `empty populism` - a lighter form of populism limited only to people-
centeredness (16% Kollár and 2% OĽaNO). Again, higher generalisation of „the 
people“ in Kollár´s case suggests thicker populism. For Kollár, collective identity 
is built largely on common fate (57% cases), which is entirely absent in OĽaNO’s 
discourse. Thus, there is a sort of a tacit nationalism present in Kollár´s 
discourse. 
Comparing discourses of both political entities during election campaign and 
during a later, non-elections period, it can be seen that their discourse became 
more populist, and more critical towards elites, after the elections. In other words, 
post-election communication returned to (thin or thick populist) “standard”. Yet, 
nevertheless, there still remained a normative difference in both entities´ rhetoric. 
It can be seen that there are important differences between communication 
of both entities during a campaign and during non-campaign periods. 
Clearly, there also is a qualitative-normative difference between Boris Kollár 
(WAF-BK) and OĽaNO. While the former is a typical representative of heavy 
populism, OĽaNO represents a lighter version of populism. A lighter version 
means that populism is more specific in its targets, focuses on more issues, 
reveals more serious disfunctions of a state (not just ad hoc relatively minor 
scandals), and in general is less negative to „others“ (including elites) and in its 
overall rhetoric and policy direction. All this can help to explain why such a lighter 
version of populism (this should not be mixed with analytical concept of a thin 
version of populism) can be seen by local activists and analysts as contributing 
to the prosperity of democracy. As it was mentioned, local analysts prefer to label 
OĽaNO as „anti-corruption, protest party/movement“ and only rarely as a 
„populist“ subject. In fact, perhaps ironically, the chairperson, or the leader, 
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Matovič is the most radical in his rhetoric and showman actions, thus, also 
sometimes rather close in this regard to another showman, Kollár, than the rest 
of OĽaNO MPs and the only MEP. 
Since neither populist entity was present in the government, this different 
normative assessment of both parties/leaders (in spite of seemingly roughly 
similar populist rhetoric based on thick and thin dimension) can be explained only 
by detailed analysis of their rhetoric and by their performance of their control 
function (checking authorities) as an opposition. Indeed, while Kollár used more 
often general criticism of elites, including their exclusion (de-legitimising them), 
OĽaNO was more specific in its criticism of specific, often individualised, 
governing elites. Kollár more often referred to people in general terms than 
OĽaNO. While Kollár was by and large interested in a limited number of issues 
related to power and authority, OĽaNO presented a variety of issues, showed 
higher concern for social welfare and fighting corruption. Finally, Kollár appealed 
to exclusionary populism, unlike OĽaNO. 
The theoretical contribution of this paper to populism index methodology is 
that 'thin' or 'thick' dimensions of populism, as such, do not reveal subtle, but 
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